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The Slow Evolution of Second
Amendment Law
Joan H. Miller 
I. INTRODUCTION
Since fall 2011, when the Seattle University Law Review first pub-
lished my comment,
1
 there have been an additional fourteen mass shoot-
ings in the United States.
2
 Twelve of the shooters exhibited signs of 
men-tal illness that were observed by family, coworkers, or even 
mental health professionals.
3
 Four of the mass shooters were undergoing 
or had undergone mental health treatment at some point in their lives, 
and one had been admitted to a psychiatric ward. Despite these warning 
signs, all but one of the shooters obtained their weapons legally. Most of 
the mass shootings occurred in public places, including one at a private 
university and another at an elementary school.
4
 
After the Sandy Hook shooting left twenty children and six 
adults dead in their elementary school, there was public momentum to 




 Policy Counsel, Washington Senate Human Services & Corrections Committee; J.D., Seattle Uni-
versity School of Law, 2012; B.A., University of Arizona, 2001. The views expressed in this Article 
are solely those of the writer and do not reflect the views of the Washington State Senate or Senate 
Committee Services.
1. Joan H. Miller, The Second Amendment Goes to College, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 235 
(2011). 
2. Mark Follman et al., US Mass Shootings, 1982–2012: Data From Mother Jones’ Investiga-
tion, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/12/mass-
shootings-mother-jones-full-data. Mother Jones periodically updates its data to reflect mass shoot-
ings as they occur. The numbers cited in the accompanying text are current through September 16, 
2013. Id. Although there is no official definition of “mass shooting,” the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation describes mass murder as a single incident with four or more victims that usually occurs in a 
single location. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SERIAL MURDER: MULTI-
DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES FOR INVESTIGATORS (2005), available at  http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publicatio ns/serial-murder/serial-murder-july-2008-pdf. 
3. Although there is a correlation between mental illness and mass shootings, a discussion 
about mental health policy as it relates to firearm regulation is beyond the scope of this update. 
4. Follman et al., supra note 2. 
5. James Barron, Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in Connecticut; 28 Dead, Includ-
ing Killer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/ 
nyregion/shooting-reported-at-connecticut-elementary-school.html. 
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short-lived. Although many politicians and scholars called for reinstating 
the federal assault-weapons ban, limiting the purchase of high-capacity 
magazines, or requiring background checks for firearms purchased at gun 
shows, Congress was unable to pass any meaningful gun control reform.
6
 
Similarly, state legislatures did not have the political will to tackle the 
issue, as only a handful of states passed gun control legislation in the 
wake of Sandy Hook.
7
 Most states that did pass gun-related legislation 
actually made firearms easier to own, carry, and conceal.
8
 
6. See, e.g., Leigh Ann Caldwell, Obama Sets Up Gun Violence Task Force, CBS NEWS (Dec. 
19, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57560044/obama-sets-up-gun-violence-task-
force/; Jennifer Steinhauer, Senator Unveils Bill to Limit Semiautomatic Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
25, 2013, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/us/politics/senator-unveils-bill-
to-limit-semiautomatic-arms.html; Jonathan Weisman, Gun Control Drive Blocked in Senate; 
Obama, in Defeat, Sees ‘Shameful Day,’ N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2013, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/us/politics/senate-obama-gun-control.html. 
7. See, e.g., H.B. 1224, 69th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013) (prohibits the sale, trans-
fer, or possession of large-capacity magazines); S.B. 1160, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 
2013) (expands the assault-weapons ban to include large-capacity magazines and armor-piercing 
bullets); H.B. 35, 147th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013) (provides for a criminal history 
background check for the sale or transfer of firearms). 
8. See, e.g., S.B. 383, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2013) (allows a local board of education to 
permit school security personnel to carry a firearm while on duty); H.B. 69, 28th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 
(Alaska 2013) (exempts certain firearms, accessories, and ammunition in the state from federal regu-
lation); H.B. 2326, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013) (prohibits political subdivisions of the state 
from requiring the licensing or registration of firearms); S.B. 389, 85th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Iowa 2013) (allows a resident age eighteen or older to obtain a certificate of completion of the 
Hunter Safety and Ethics Education course without demonstrating the safe handling of a firearm); 
H.B. 0183, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013) (establishes a license for the concealed carry of 
firearms within Illinois); S.B. 102, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013) (exempts certain firearms, 
accessories, and ammunition in the state from federal regulation); S.B. 150, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Ky. 2013) (removes the length of residency requirement to a concealed carry license); H.B. 533, 
97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013) (requires the state to allow state employees to keep a 
firearm locked and concealed in their vehicles); H.B. 2, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2013) (allows 
persons under twenty-one years of age to carry a concealed weapon if they are members or veterans 
of the armed forces); H.B. 1283, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (allows concealed carry permit 
holders to bring their firearms to public gatherings, including athletic or sporting events, schools, 
churches, or political rallies); S.B. 142, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013) (allows a 
concealed carry permit holder to transport and store a firearm or ammunition in a vehicle located on 
public or private parking areas); H.B. 0006 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013) (authorizes 
the carrying of a firearm on school grounds by specified persons); S.B. 1907, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Tex. 2013) (prohibits higher education institutions from placing restrictions on the storage of fire-
arms in the vehicles of concealed carry permit holders); H.B. 317, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Utah 2013) 
(prohibits the sharing of concealed firearm permit information with the federal government); H.B. 
940, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012) (eliminates the prohibition on purchasing more than 
one handgun in a thirty-day period); H.B. 754, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012) (removes 
the option for a locality to require that concealed carry permit applicants submit fingerprints as part 
of the application); H.B. 375, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012) (prohibits localities from 
adopting a workplace rule that prevents an employee from storing a firearm and ammunition in a 
vehicle); H.B. 1582, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013) (allows armed security officers to 
carry firearms in private or religious schools; prohibits the Board of Social Services from adopting 
any regulations that would prevent a child daycare center from hiring an armed security officer). 
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In The Second Amendment Goes to College, I argued that “gun-free 
zones” on public college and university campuses are constitutionally 
permissible under strict scrutiny because the policy is narrowly tailored 
to achieve the compelling interests of academic freedom and public safe-
ty.
9
 More specifically, I argued that the academic freedom doctrine, 
which is enshrined in the First Amendment, necessarily restricts state 
legislatures from interfering with the policy choices made by public col-
leges and universities.
10
 When analogizing gun-free zones to time, man-
ner, and place restrictions often imposed on the right to free speech in 
public places, I concluded that a college’s interest in maintaining the free 
exchange of ideas and the collective security of its campus by prohibiting 
guns outweighs any individual right of self-defense on its premises.
11
 
Rather than reexamining these conclusions, this update will focus on the 
changes in Second Amendment law that have occurred over the past two 
years. 
II. CASE LAW UPDATE
Since District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago, 
Second Amendment jurisprudence has been slowly evolving, as lower 
courts grapple with how to analyze gun control regulations in the wake 
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding that there is an individual right to 
keep and bear arms in self-defense of “hearth and home.”
12
 Neither case 
addressed the appropriate standard of review for lower courts to use. In 
my comment, I argued that although gun-free zones on college campuses 
would likely survive strict scrutiny, the appropriate standard of review 
should be intermediate scrutiny.
13
 Since then, several appellate courts 
have reviewed regulations such as age-based handgun restrictions,
14
 con-
9. Miller, supra note 1, at 238. 
10. Id. at 263. 
11. Id. at 251–52. 
12. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that law-abiding citizens 
have an individual right to keep and bear arms in self-defense of hearth and home); McDonald v. 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3025, 3050 (2010) (incorporating the Second Amendment right recognized in 
Heller against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
13. Miller, supra note 1, at 250. To survive intermediate scrutiny, the government must
demonstrate that the challenged regulation is substantially related to furthering an important gov-
ernment interest. Id. at 253. 
14. See, e.g., NRA v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338, 347–48 (5th Cir. 2013) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to a Texas statute prohibiting eighteen- to twenty-year-olds from carrying firearms in pub-
lic). 
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duct-based firearm restrictions,
15
 and concealed carry permitting 
schemes
16
 under intermediate scrutiny.  
Recently, concealed carry permitting schemes and restrictions have 
been challenged as violative of the Second Amendment. Many lower 
courts now employ a two-pronged test to determine if a gun control regu-
lation is constitutionally permissible: (1) whether the challenged law im-
poses a burden on conduct historically protected by the Second Amend-
ment; and (2) if so, whether the law survives under some form of means-
ends scrutiny.
17
 If the challenged law does not fall within the scope of the 
Second Amendment, then the law is upheld and the analysis ends. If the 
law does implicate the Second Amendment, then courts must balance 
“the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the 
challenged law burdens the right”
18
 to determine the appropriate level of 
means-ends scrutiny: 
A regulation that threatens a right at the core of the Second 
Amendment—for example, the right of a law-abiding, responsible 
adult to possess and use a handgun to defend his or her home and 
family—triggers strict scrutiny. A less severe regulation—a regula-
tion that does not encroach on the core of the Second Amendment—
requires a less demanding means-ends showing.
19
Under this framework, there is currently a circuit court split as to 
whether the concealed carry of firearms even falls within the scope of the 
Second Amendment. For example, the Tenth Circuit U.S. Court of Ap-
peals has held that the Second Amendment does not confer a right to car-
ry a concealed weapon.
20
 The court reasoned that Heller and McDonald 
held only that individuals have a right to keep and bear arms in self-
15. See, e.g., Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 989 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (analyzing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1), which prohibits certain common-law misdemeanants from possessing firearms, under 
intermediate scrutiny).
16. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that a justifiable-need 
requirement for a concealed carry permit survives intermediate scrutiny); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 
F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he good-and-substantial-reason requirement passes constitutional 
muster under what we have deemed to be the applicable standard—intermediate scrutiny.”). 
17. See, e.g., Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 
85, 89–90 (3d Cir. 2010). 
18. BATFE, 700 F.3d at 194 (quoting Chester, 628 F.3d at 682). 
19. Id. at 195 (citing Chester, 628 F.3d at 682). Intermediate scrutiny is an example of a less 
demanding means-ends showing, which is generally the standard of review courts use to analyze 
regulations that do not implicate the core right of the Second Amendment. See, e.g., id. at 195–96. 
20. Peterson, 707 F.3d at 1201 (“In light of our nation’s extensive practice of restricting citi-
zens’ freedom to carry firearms in a concealed manner, we hold that this activity does not fall within 
the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections.”). 
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defense of hearth and home.
21
 This right does not extend to the carrying 
of weapons in public places, and therefore, concealed carry permitting 
schemes regulate conduct that does not implicate the Second Amend-
ment.
22
 The Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, on the other hand, 
held that there was no question that concealed carry laws fall within the 
scope of the Second Amendment because, rather than implicating that 
the right does not extend outside the home, Heller and McDonald found 
only that the need for self-defense is “most acute in the home.”
23
  
In many cases, however, lower courts have chosen to avoid decid-
ing the constitutional issue under the first prong and instead proceed with 
analyzing the standard of review.
24
 For example, most courts agree that it 
is constitutionally permissible for a state to deny a concealed carry per-
mit to convicted felons or domestic violence misdemeanants.
25
 There is a 
strong consensus that this type of regulation furthers a state’s significant 
interest in keeping deadly weapons from individuals who have proven to 
be violent, and many courts have upheld these types of laws without an-
swering the constitutional questions.
26
 Additionally, justifiable-need 
standards, which determine whether a concealed carry permit may be 
issued to a particular individual,
27
 have survived intermediate scrutiny, 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2013)  (“To confine the right to be 
armed to the home is to divorce the Second Amendment from the right of self-defense described in 
Heller and McDonald.”). 
24. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (“It remains unsettled whether 
the individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home.”); United 
States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has not clarified, and we have 
not held, that the Second Amendment extends beyond the home.”); Hightower v. Boston, 693 F.3d 
61, 72 n.8 (1st Cir. 2012) (“We do not reach the issue of the scope of the Second Amendment as to 
carrying firearms outside the vicinity of the home without any reference to protection of the home.”). 
25. See, e.g., Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 989 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Arm-
strong, 706 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2013); Mahin, 668 F.3d at 123–24. 
26. See, e.g., Mahin, 668 F.3d at 123–24.
27. This standard generally requires applicants for a concealed carry permit to demonstrate that 
they have a special need for self-defense in public places that is distinguishable from the general 
community’s need. See Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (“To 
establish proper cause to obtain a license . . . an applicant must demonstrate a special need for self-
protection distinguishable from that of the general community or of persons engaged in the same 
profession. [] Unlike a license for target shooting or hunting, a generalized desire to carry a con-
cealed weapon to protect one’s person and property does not constitute proper cause.” (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted)); In re Preis, 573 A.2d 148, 152 (1990) (“[T]here must be an 
urgent necessity [] for self-protection. The requirement is of specific threats or previous attacks 
demonstrating a special danger to the applicant’s life that cannot be avoided by other means. Gener-
alized fears for personal safety are inadequate.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
There are a handful of states that require applicants to demonstrate a justifiable need. See, e.g., 
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(6)(ii) (2013) (“[The applicant] has good and substantial 
reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a finding that the permit is necessary as a 
reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.”); N.J. STAT. § 2C:58-4(c) (2013) (“No applica-
6 Seattle University Law Review SUpra [Vol. 37:1 
even when the court has punted on the question of whether the concealed 
carry of firearms in public places is conduct protected by the  Second 
Amendment.
28
 These courts have argued that, in the alternative, even if 
the right does extend to public places, a justifiable-need standard for is-
suing permits is a long-standing regulation that enjoys presumptive con-
stitutionality under Heller.
29
 The Seventh Circuit expressed only in dicta 
that a justifiable-need standard would likely survive constitutional scruti-
ny.
30
 The court, however, did explicitly declare that a blanket prohibition 
on carrying guns in public would be a substantial curtailment of the right 
to bear arms in self-defense.
31
 Accordingly, it did not base its analysis on 
degrees of scrutiny because the Illinois statute was an effective ban on 
the concealed carrying of firearms in public.
32
 Instead, the court held that 
the State did not meet its burden of showing that it had more than a ra-




While several courts have addressed the constitutionality of carry-




III. CARRYING ON CAMPUS TRENDS
Although higher education institutions prefer to keep weapons off 
their campuses, state legislatures continue to influence the policy deci-
sions of public colleges and universities. In 2011, Utah was the only state 
that did not give its public colleges and universities the statutory authori-
                                                                                                                                  
tion shall be approved . . . unless the applicant demonstrates . . . that he has a justifiable need to carry 
a handgun.”); N.Y. CLS PENAL § 400.00(2)(f) (2013) (“A license . . . shall be issued to . . . have and 
carry concealed, without regard to employment or place of possession, by any person when proper 
cause exists for the issuance thereof.”). 
28. See, e.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e merely assume 
that the Heller right exists outside the home and that such right of Appellee Woollard has been in-
fringed. We are free to make that assumption because the good-and-substantial-reason requirement 
passes constitutional muster under . . . intermediate scrutiny.”). 
29. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430, 433 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The ‘justifiable need’ standard fits 
comfortably within the longstanding tradition of regulating the public carrying of weapons for self-
defense. [] We conclude that even if the ‘justifiable need’ standard did not qualify as a ‘presumptive-
ly lawful,’ ‘longstanding’ regulation, . . . it would withstand intermediate scrutiny, providing a sec-
ond, independent basis for concluding that the standard is constitutional.”). 
30. Moore v. Madigan, F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2013).
31. Id. at 940. 
32. Id. at 941. 
33. Id. at 942. 
34. See also Shaundra K. Lewis, Bullets and Books by Legislative Fiat: Why Academic Free-
dom and Public Policy Permit Higher Education Institutions to Say No to Guns, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 
1, 9 (2011). 
2014] Slow Evolution of Second Amendment Law 7 
ty to prohibit or restrict firearms on their campuses.
35
 Today, seven states 
















 Twenty-one states continue to prohibit firearms, whether concealed 
or not, on public college and university campuses: Arkansas, California, 
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyo-
ming.
43
 Twenty-two states allow their public colleges and universities to 
35. Miller, supra note 1, at 244–45; see also Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 144 P.3d 1109 (Utah 
2006). 
36. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the Colorado Board of Regents did not have the 
authority to ban concealed carry permit holders from bringing guns onto its public campuses. Stu-
dents for Concealed Carry on Campus v. Univ. of Colo., 271 P.3d 496, 501, 502 (Colo. 2012) 
(“[W]e hold that the CCA divested the Board of Regents of its authority to regulate concealed hand-
gun possession on campus.”). 
37. See infra text accompanying notes 49–50. 
38. Michigan law allows concealed carry permit holders to carry firearms on campuses, but 
weapons may not be carried inside classrooms or dormitories. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.425o(h) 
(2012). 
39. In Mississippi, the legislature passed a bill prohibiting colleges and universities from ban-
ning weapons for concealed carry permit holders who have completed a voluntary “enhanced” train-
ing program. H.B. 506, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011). Because of uncertainties in the statutory 
language, many post-secondary schools in Mississippi continue to ban firearms in dormitories, din-
ing halls, and event centers. 
40. In 2011, an Oregon Court of Appeals held that public state colleges and universities do not 
have the authority to ban weapons on the physical grounds of a campus. Or. Firearms Educ. Found. 
v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 264 P.3d 160, 165 (Or. Ct. App. 2011). But each school does have discretion 
to prohibit concealed weapons inside buildings, dormitories, event centers, and classrooms. Id. at 
162. Although the Oregon University System chose not to appeal the decision due to the associated
costs, the Oregon Higher Education Board voted unanimously to ban weapons inside all buildings of 
the seven public colleges and universities in the state. Bill Graves, Oregon State Board of Higher 
Education Resorts to Policy to Ban Guns on Campus, OREGONIAN (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.ore
gonlive.com/education/index.ssf/2012/03/oregon_state_board_of_higher_e_7.html.
41. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53B-3-103(2) (2007). In Utah, students may request that they be paired 
with a dormitory roommate who does not have a concealed carry weapon permit. Id. Private hearing 
rooms on campus have been designated as “secure areas” where firearms may be restricted by the 
college. Id. 
42. In 2011, Wisconsin was one of only two states that prohibited the carrying of concealed 
weapons altogether. That same year, the legislature passed Senate Bill 93, which made significant 
changes to gun control law in the state of Wisconsin, including allowing the concealed carry of 
firearms on the campuses of public colleges and universities. S.B. 93, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 
2011). The bill includes a provision that allows post-secondary institutions to prohibit concealed 
weapons from campus buildings if appropriate signage is posted at every entrance. Id. “All Universi-
ty of Wisconsin system campuses and technical community college districts are said to be putting 
this signage in place.” Guns on Campus: Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/guns-on-campus-overview.aspx (last updated January 2014), 
[hereinafter NCSL]. 
43. The respective state laws are as follows: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-119(c)(1) (2013); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 626.9 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 790.06(12) (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1(b) 
(2011); H.B. 0183, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:95.2, 14:95.6 
8 Seattle University Law Review SUpra [Vol. 37:1 
independently determine gun policy on campus: Alabama, Alaska, Ari-
zona, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West 
Virginia.
44
 Of all the two-year and four-year post-secondary schools in 
these states, only eight have established policies that allow concealed 
firearms to be carried on all or portions of their campuses.
45
 A handful of 
states continue to allow gun-free zones on campuses but provide an ex-
ception for firearms stored in locked vehicles on campus parking lots: 
Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.
46
 
Finally, both Arkansas and Kansas passed legislation in 2013 that 
may signal a shift in policy responses to the issue of guns on campus. 
The Arkansas legislature passed a bill that permits faculty to carry weap-
ons but allows schools to opt out of this policy annually.
47
 To date, every 
post-secondary school in Arkansas has exercised its right to opt out.
48
 In 
Kansas, public colleges and universities may not establish gun-free 
(2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10(j) (2012); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 6, § 250-4.010(10); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1204.04(1) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.3673(3)(a) (2011), N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:39-5e(1) (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-2.4(A), (C)(1) (2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§§ 265.01(3), 265.01-a (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2(b) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-
05 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.126(B)(5) (2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1277(E) (2009); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-420(A) (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1309(c)(1) (1996); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 46.03(1) (2003); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104(t)(x) (2013).
44. NCSL, supra note 42. 
45. In Virginia, Liberty University, a private institution, allows any permit holder to carry a 
concealed weapon on campus. LIBERTY UNIVERSITY WEAPONS POLICY, §§ (3)(C),(D) & (E), avail-
able at http://www.liberty.edu/media/1370/Weapons_Policy_Revision_1.pdf.  Old Dominion Uni-
versity, a public institution, allows only visitors with a concealed carry permit to possess a firearm 
on campus; the policy prohibits students or faculty from carrying a concealed weapon, regardless of 
permit status. FIREARMS, WEAPONS, AND CERTAIN RELATED DEVICES, NO. 1013, at 1, available at 
http://www.odu.edu/content/dam/odu/offices/bov/policies/1000/BOV1013.pdf. There are six public 
colleges or universities in Pennsylvania that allow concealed carry in some form: California Univer-
sity, Edinboro University, Lockhaven University, and Millersville University allow concealed carry 
permit holders to carry firearms in open spaces, but they may not bring them into buildings or sport-
ing events; Kutztown University and Slippery Rock University require concealed carry permit hold-
ers to obtain permission from the institution to bring a weapon onto campus. Laws Concerning Car-
rying Concealed Firearms on Campus in Pennsylvania, ARMED CAMPUSES, http://www.armedcamp 
uses.org/pennsylvania/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2014) [hereinafter ARMED CAMPUSES]. 
46. The respective state laws or case law are as follows: Mitchell v. Univ. of Ky., 366 S.W.3d 
895 (Ky. 2012); MINN. STAT. § 624.714, subd. 18(c); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1204.04(1) (2011); H.B 
937, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-420(A), 16-23-430(B) 
(2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.126(B)(5) (2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1277(E)(1) 
(2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1309(c)(1) (1996) (only nonstudents may store a firearm in their 
vehicle); and S.B. 1907, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013). 
47. H.B. 1243, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013).
48. ARMED CAMPUSES, supra note 45. 
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zones, unless adequate security measures are in place.
49
 Schools may, 
however, request an exemption for up to four years.
50
 These statutes are 
novel policy responses in that they either allow only a certain class of 
persons to carry guns on campus (e.g., school faculty) or require the edu-
cational institution to take an affirmative action to reduce the public’s 
need for self-defense on its campus. 
IV. CONCLUSION
As of 2013, all fifty states now allow the concealed carry of fire-
arms under certain circumstances. Circuit courts continue to analyze the 
proper scope of the Second Amendment as it applies to public places, 
with intermediate scrutiny emerging as the dominant standard of review 
for laws that do not implicate the core right of self-defense in the home. 
The overwhelming majority of colleges and universities in this country 
support gun-free zones on their campuses, even for individuals with a 
concealed carry permit. They feel strongly that a change in this policy 
would not be in the best interests of their students. Despite their expertise 
in creating environments conducive to learning and to the free exchange 
of ideas, state legislatures continue to pass laws that make it harder for 
schools (and other localities) to determine who may carry a gun and 
where it may be carried.  
49. H.B. 2052, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013). At least one author has advocated for this 
approach. See Brian C. Whitman, Comment, In Defense of Self-Defense: Heller’s Second Amend-
ment in Sensitive Places, 7 MISS. L.J. 1987 (2012). 
50. H.B. 2052. Kansas also allows firearms in K–12 schools. Id. 
